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—To the Editors— 
 
In a recent study, Kerr and Wilson (2018) claim to provide a failed test of the 
Gateway Belief Model (GBM) using a cross-lagged panel analysis with 356 college students. 
Although we applaud the authors’ effort to extend scholarly work on the GBM, we point out 
several mischaracterizations of our work and present evidence that contradicts their findings.  
First, we are puzzled by the authors’ main conclusion that; “in a more ecologically-
valid setting, consensus beliefs do not have a strong influence on personal beliefs over time” 
(Kerr & Wilson, 2018, p. 7). Cross-lagged correlations can be used to assess causal 
relationships in the GBM, but actual experimental tests of the GBM path relationships  
provide much stronger evidence for the direction of causality because random experimental 
assignment ensures that the consensus treatment causes a change in personal beliefs and not 
vice versa (van der Linden et al., 2015). Moreover, the authors do not provide a full test of 
the GBM as claimed, as none of the other causal path relationships (such as worry and 
support for action) were measured or fitted to the data. The authors also suggest that their 
results bolster other findings that show that increasing perceived consensus does not mediate 
impact on personal beliefs (p. 3). Yet, the two studies cited do not support this claim. For 
example, Dixon et al. (2017) did not measure perceived scientific consensus and van der 
Linden et al. (2015) did find significant effects on personal beliefs. 
Second, while the authors mention a “change in consensus estimates” between Time 1 
and Time 2 (p.5), examination of the pre-post means reveals that no change actually occurred 
in the authors’ data for consensus (Mpreconsensus = 77.98, Mpostconsensus = 78.73) or beliefs 
(Mprebelief = 5.16, Mpostbelief = 5.18). Thus, we are unsure what “change” the authors are 
measuring. Moreover, we strongly question whether the authors’ sample of undergraduate 
psychology students in New Zealand (78% female, 36% liberal)—with high pre consensus 
and climate beliefs—exhibited enough variation to allow for a reliable cross-lagged analysis. 
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Accordingly, to improve ecological validity, we conceptually replicate the analysis on 
a nationally representative (U.S.) within-subject panel of respondents, surveyed 6 months 
apart (Maibach et al., 2015), similar to the 5 months lag used by Kerr & Wilson (2018). This 
dataset included the same measure of perceived scientific consensus (“To the best of your 
knowledge, what proportion of climate scientists think that global warming is caused mostly 
by human activities?” 0% - 100%) and a relevant climate belief item (ranging from, 1 = 
“global warming isn’t happening” to 4 = “caused mostly by human activities”). The first 
wave of data was collected in March of 2015 (n = 1,263) and the second wave in September 
of 2015 (n = 905) via GfK’s KnowledgePanel© using national probability sampling. The 
methods and panel attrition rate (28%) are fully described in Maibach et al. (2015).  
Similar to Kerr and Wilson (2018), we found positive and significant correlations 
between perceived consensus and belief in climate change at each time point (r1 = 0.37, p < 
0.001, and r2 = 0.41, p < 0.001). Perceived consensus and climate change beliefs slightly 
increased over the period (Mpreconsensus = 64.71, SD = 23.13, Mpostconsensus = 67.44, SD = 23.37, 
Mprebelief = 3.24, SD = 0.93, Mpostbelief = 3.27, SD = 0.89). We estimated the cross-lagged 
model using STATA 14.2 and found an acceptable fit to the data (χ2
 
(1) = 17.85, p < 0.001, 
CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.90, RMSEA = 0.11, [90%CI: 0.06-0.16]). Unlike Kerr and Wilson 
(2018), however, we found a significant relationship between perceived scientific consensus 
at Time 1 and belief in climate change at Time 2 (β = 0.24, p < 0.001). We also found a 
significant path from belief in climate change at Time 1 to perceived consensus at Time 2        
(β = 0.16, p < 0.001), albeit marginally weaker (∆β= -0.08, p = 0.06). In contrast to Kerr & 
Wilson (2018), our analysis further found that the effect of perceived scientific consensus at 
Time 1 on belief in climate change at Time 2 held for both liberals (β = 0.35, 95%CI; 0.20, 
0.50) as well as conservatives (β = 0.18, 95%CI; 0.08, 0.28).  
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Figure 1. Standardized coefficients between personal beliefs and perceptions of the scientific 
consensus (r = 0.37) over time (T1, T2). Note: ***p < 0.001, **p<0.01. Missing data were 
estimated with Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML, see Enders & Bandalos, 
2001). 95% confidence intervals are provided in parentheses (bootstrapped 1,000 times). 
 
 In short, Kerr and Wilson’s findings conflict with conclusions from multiple 
experimental studies as well as a cross-lagged model analysis using a nationally 
representative panel of respondents. This raises serious questions about the authors’ claims. 
Although it is certainly possible that consensus perceptions and climate beliefs can 
dynamically influence each other over time, we caution against strong and inappropriate 
inferences drawn from partial tests on non-representative observational data. Lastly, it is 
interesting to note that in both studies the correlations between perceived consensus and 
belief in climate change at Time 1-2 were stronger than their respective cross-lagged 
correlations, which could suggest a common method factor. For these reasons, we encourage 
future research to use experimental (field) studies to test the predictions of the GBM. 
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• Using a national panel sample, this study provides a cross-lagged test of the GBM 
• We fail to replicate findings presented by Kerr & Wilson (2018) 
• We clearly find that perceived consensus predicts later personal climate beliefs 
• These findings hold for both liberals and conservatives 
 
 
